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Upshot: Baron locates the decolonisation of the curriculum within the 
classroom, repurposing radically constructivist approaches to teaching and 
learning and giving them a sense of social and political urgency. The inclusion 
of students’ worldviews in the curriculum is best thought of as the beginning of a 
process rather than an end in itself. This leads beyond the pedagogic focus of 
Baron’s article, raising questions about the status of professional knowledge 
and whose terms equality is offered on. 
1. Philip Baron’s reflexive approach to the decolonisation of the curriculum focuses 
on the processes of teaching and learning. This is the case even where content seems to 
be to the forefront, such as with the incorporation of the worldviews and life experience 
of participating students. The significance of this goes beyond situating and diversifying 
what is being taught in the course. Whatever new content is introduced through live 
student participation, this process is itself politically and socially significant, enabling 
the relationships between learners, curriculum, and tutors to be reformulated such that 
“all the participants are part of the knowledge-creation process” and “groups who were 
previously disregarded may be invited to actively engage” (§2). 
2. In this focus on process, Baron’s approach is deeply aligned with radical 
constructivism, which Ernst von Glasersfeld (1990: 19) characterised as a theory of 
knowing rather than of knowledge. Indeed, it is striking how closely Baron’s approach 
coincides with radically constructivist attitudes to teaching and learning. Maintaining an 
environment conducive to conversation (§17), the need for learners to build new ideas 
in terms of what they already know (§10), and situating learning so that it is clear why it 
is useful (§§21ff) can each be advocated for entirely pedagogic reasons (cf. Glasersfeld 
1995: 176ff). Baron’s explicitly political and social reasons for adopting these 
approaches give them a sense of urgency and relevance that is not always present where 
radical constructivism is introduced in more abstract or philosophical terms. 
3. That common cause can be found between the decolonisation of the curriculum and 
radical constructivism should not be surprising. Radical constructivism challenges some 
of the assumptions that are at the root (hence its radicalism) of the Western tradition 
(§25) and, in so doing, undermines the privileging of that (and, indeed, any) worldview. 
Might one therefore position radical constructivism’s critique of objectivity as a project 
of decolonising epistemology? Perhaps, but there is reason to proceed cautiously, 
especially given that radical constructivism is itself located within Western thought, 
albeit as a form of counter-tradition (Glasersfeld 1990, 2007). In the same way that 
introducing diversified content into the canon is not merely to balance it but to put in 
question how canonicity is and has been produced, principles such as the inclusion of 
the observer (§34) and the accompanying shift from hierarchy to heterarchy (§§24ff) 
must not be treated as ends in themselves but as ways to open up further questions. 
4. The inclusion of students is only a first step. It is not just that they are included, but 
also a question of who is being included and who is not; what they are being included 
in; how, when, where and on whose terms this happens; and whether this might be a 
different experience for participants from different backgrounds. Baron is commendably 
specific in his article, but there are places where these questions go beyond the scope of 
his account. For instance, social justice may be addressed by “including the students’ 
worldviews in the classroom” (§2) only if this is done in a way where these worldviews 
enter on equal terms. This is less straightforward than it first appears. As philosopher of 
science Paul Feyerabend has articulated, when we speak of equality we often do so in 
ways that already reflect the dominance of particular discourses and groups:  
“Equality, including equality of women and ‘racial’ equality, does not mean equality of 
traditions; it means equality of access to one particular tradition – the tradition of the White 
Man. White Liberals supporting the demand for equality have opened the promised land – but 
it is a promised land built according to their own specifications, filled with their own favourite 
playthings and accessible only in accordance with their particular requirements…” 
(Feyerabend 1980: 14) 
5. Thus, while the superiority of modern science is often assumed, it “prevails not 
because of its comparative merits, but because the show has been rigged in its favour” 
(Feyerabend 1978:102, italics original). This is in part a legacy of colonialism, where 
non-Western traditions have declined as a result of political suppression rather than on 
the basis of research or argument. Non-Western traditions have not been evaluated in 
fair terms: 
 “The sciences, it is said, are uniformly better than all alternatives – but where is the evidence 
to support this claim? Where, for example, are the control groups which show the uniform 
(and not only the occasional) superiority of Western scientific medicine over the medicine of 
the Nei Ching? Or over Hopi medicine? Such control groups need patients that have been 
treated in the Hopi manner, or in the Chinese manner using Hopi experts and experts in 
traditional Chinese medicine…” (Feyerabend 1980: 13) 
6. Feyerabend’s critique can be extended to the context of engineering and technology 
in which Baron is writing. Much like medicine, engineering was instrumental to 
colonial expansion and in the development of the dominant discourse of Western 
society. The apparent successes of modern technology are successes in terms of its own 
materialistic standards. Its failures, like the ecological crisis, are perpetuated where 
they are thought of merely as problems still to be solved through the same techniques. 
That is, the assumptions under which professional fields such as engineering are taught 
are themselves in need of being subjected to critique. 
7. This is an important consideration in the context of Baron’s reflexive approach, as 
professional skills are the one fixed point that has to be covered in the curriculum. This 
could become an unexamined dynamic shaping the conversations in the classroom. In 
architectural education, for instance, it is difficult for a student to meet all the criteria 
unless they propose a suitably complex building. Yet, to propose a programmatic way 
of addressing a situation and not building a building at all is still a legitimate and 
sophisticated architectural strategy, albeit one that is not in the financial interests of the 
building industry. It is similarly a legitimate engineering strategy to reframe Baron’s 
example of the earthing of metal shacks (§§21ff) to address others aspects of this 
situation, such as the prevalence of informal housing and the political and economic 
issues that underlie this. Such a path, however, may not cover the principles of earthing 
that are required by professional expectations. 
8. Baron’s reconciliation of his approach to assessment with professional expectations 
(§§6ff) is thus much more central than it at first appears. Established professional skills 
do not necessarily need to be unpicked, but their status is in as much need of being 
questioned as any other element of content if the diverse worldviews of students are to 
be taken seriously. The reflexive approach that Baron proposes could be used to do all 
this. It is, however, important to ask what purposes, motivations and power structures 
are at play, even within heterarchical forms of organisation. Reflexion, for instance, can 
operate conservatively, establishing self-reinforcing norms within the group. The 
politics of all this is therefore highly dependent on the particular tutors, who, while they 
may not have “unilateral power in the classroom” (§26), still occupy a privileged 
position, even in a conversational format (Sweeting 2014). 
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